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Do We Have It Right This Time? An Analysis of 
the Accomplishments and Shortcomings of 
Washington’s Indian Child Welfare Act 
Karen Gray Young 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Jessie Scheibner’s eyes cloud with tears and her voice trembles as 
she talks about the day, almost 70 years ago, when a stranger’s car 
pulled up to her parents’ home on the Port Gamble S’Klallam 
Reservation and took her and her two sisters away. 
The memories of that car ride when she was three and the years 
spent in one foster home after another are hazy. Foster care was 
difficult enough, but Scheibner, now 72, clearly recalls being 
ashamed of her dark hair, brown skin, and Indian American roots 
as she bounced from home to home off the reservation.1 
 Governmental removal of Indian2 children from their families has had 
devastating results for native tribes across the nation. Washington State is 
no exception. The federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was passed in 
1978 as a mechanism to prevent this long-standing practice, and the success 
                                                                                                                     

 Karen Gray Young is a 2013 graduate of the Seattle University School of Law. She 
received her BA in English Literature from Western Washington University. A special 
thanks to the women who inspired and championed this piece: Heidi K. Adams, Katie 
Jones, Margaret Lerfald, and Laurie Gray. Most importantly, this article is dedicated to 
our social workers and the communities they so valiantly serve.  
1 Jennifer Sullivan, Tribe Takes Control of Child Welfare From State, SEATTLE TIMES, 
Mar. 28, 2012, http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2017861071_portgamble29m. 
html. 
2 This article will utilize the term “Indian” when referring to Native Americans and 
first-nation people because this is the specific legal term utilized in both the ICWA and 
WICWA. See Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1993); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 13.38 (2011). 
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(or failure) of the ICWA has been evaluated and discussed on a national 
level since coming into effect.3 However, it is at the state level where the 
success of the ICWA can be most directly evaluated and, conversely, its 
failure most concretely demonstrated.  
 In 1993, Kim Laree Schnuelle addressed the application and implications 
of the ICWA on Washington’s child removal policies and procedures in her 
article titled “When the Bough Breaks: Federal and Washington State 
Indian Child Welfare Law and Its Application.”4 Schnuelle argued, “both 
the federal [ICWA] and the Washington [ICWA] law suffer from 
incomplete, vague language and serious problems of noncompliance in the 
field.”5 In the end, she concluded “the Washington State Indian Child 
Welfare Manual [the most current guidance on the ICWA at the time] has 
attempted to clarify the law in this area, but more is needed to enforce 
compliance and to fully protect Indian children.”6  
 In May 2011, in response to similar demands for greater ICWA 
compliance from scholars and Washington child welfare advocates, the 
Washington legislature adopted the provisions of the ICWA as state law by 
passing the Washington Indian Child Welfare Act (WICWA).7 Through 
passage of this act, the legislature attempted to create better understanding 
about, and adherence to, the federal ICWA.8 Whether the WICWA will 
actually generate such compliance and address Schnuelle’s call for 
clarification and improvement is the central question of this article. 
 The WICWA is generally intended to do the following: 
                                                                                                                     
3 Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1993); Legislative History of 
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, NATIVE AM. RIGHTS FUND, 
http://www.narf.org/icwa/federal/lh.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2013). 
4 Kim Larree Schnuelle, When the Bough Breaks: Federal and Washington State Indian 
Child Welfare Law and its Application, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 101(1993). 
5 Id. at 138. 
6 Id. 
7   WASH. REV. CODE §13.38 (2011); S.B. 5656, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011). 
8 WASH. REV. CODE §13.38 (2011); S.B. 5656, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011). 
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1. Clarify Washington’s interpretation of the federal Indian Child Welfare 
Act; 
2. Assure quicker, more accurate identification of Indian children in the 
child welfare system; 
3. Assure consistent application and enforcement of the federal ICWA; 
4. Assure that existing policies, practices, and agreements, developed 
over the last thirty years between the State and the tribal nations of 
Washington are the benchmarks against which federal ICWA 
compliance is measured; and 
5. Better define the types of “child custody” cases affected by federal and 
[s]tate Indian child welfare laws.9 
Specifically, the language of the WICWA, which includes the “active 
efforts” standard for agencies and agency social workers,” states that 
Washington is “committed to protecting the essential tribal relations and 
best interests of Indian children by promoting practices designed to prevent 
out-of-home placement of Indian children that is inconsistent with the rights 
of the parents, the health, safety, or welfare of the children, or the interests 
of their tribe.”10 WICWA advocates and supporters hope that education on 
the Act’s provisions, as well as “its vigorous enforcement will help 
substantially reduce the persistent disproportiona[tly] high presence of 
Indian children in all levels and aspects of Washington’s child welfare 
system.”11 
 The need for clear and applicable ICWA provisions at the state and 
federal level has never been greater. The application and implementation of 
the ICWA and its unique provisions and specifications on the child welfare 
system is particularly relevant due to the correlation between child welfare 
                                                                                                                     
9 New Indian Child Welfare Act, NW. JUSTICE PROJECT, http://nwjustice.org/new-
indian-child-welfare-act (last visited Feb. 4, 2013). 
10 WASH. REV. CODE § 13.38.030 (2011). 
11 NW. JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 9. 
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issues and the economic health of families and communities.12 As the 
national and regional economy “continues to downward spiral, more and 
more families will face economic hardship and more will fall into 
poverty.”13 In particular, several studies have demonstrated children living 
in poverty are more likely to become involved with Child Protective 
Services (CPS).14  
This article will attempt to address several questions about this issue. 
First, will Washington’s adoption of the ICWA into state law accomplish its 
goal? Second, have the problems with the ICWA’s implementation in 
Washington, as specifically outlined by Schnuelle in her article, been 
addressed? Third, will the recent passage of WICWA fill the current 
compliance gaps, move Washington toward greater ICWA adherence, and 
ultimately protect Indian children? Last, will the definitional clarifications 
in the WICWA, particularly regarding the “active efforts” standard that 
agency social workers must meet in order to remove an Indian child from 
their home, bring actual clarity to the government’s heightened duty in 
ICWA proceedings? If not, what further action is needed? 
It is my assertion that while the new statutory language in the WICWA is 
somewhat helpful for statutory interpretation, in that it provides some 
definitional clarity, particularly in the “best interests of the child,” many 
terms remain ambiguous. In particular, it is unclear what actions would 
fulfill the “active efforts” requirement by governmental social workers. 
Without this critical clarification from the legislature, the WICWA still runs 
                                                                                                                     
12 See Amanda Tucker, The Indian Child Welfare Act’s Unconstitutional Impact on the 
Welfare of the Indian Child, 9 WHITTIER J. CHILD. & FAM. ADVOC. 87 (2009). 
13 Id. (quoting JANE BURSTAIN, THE CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY, THE 2010-11 BUDGET AND 
CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES: TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 81ST LEGIS. 2 (Tex. 2009), 
available at http://library.cppp.org/files/4/burstainCPS.pdf). 
14 Id. 
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a great risk of widespread non-compliance, ultimately harming the very 
population the Act is designed to protect—Indian children. 
This comment will analyze the accomplishments and shortcomings of the 
WICWA by first reviewing the history and national policy for the original 
ICWA, focusing in particular on Washington’s application and 
interpretation of this federal statue. Next, the reasons for the initial passage 
of the ICWA will be addressed, particularly as a response to the long-
standing and evasive government policy of removing Indian children from 
their families. Then, this comment will discuss how the ICWA has been 
applied and complied with, generally, by various states since its passage, 
focusing specifically on Washington State. This comment will then explore 
the recently enacted WICWA, including Washington’s legislative intent, 
and the statute’s new definitions. Finally, this comment will discuss 
whether these definitions are adequate, for the purpose of keeping Indian 
children with their families to the greatest extent possible.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Foundations of Federal Indian Law 
Legislation relating to Indians must adhere to the basic legal principles 
that make up the canon of federal Indian law, as articulated in the US 
Constitution and various nineteenth century US Supreme Court cases 
explaining the US government’s relationship with Indian tribes.15 
Therefore, a brief discussion of these fundamental principles is necessary.  
 In the original US Constitution, Indians are mentioned twice: (1) where 
Indians are excluded from federal representation figures, and (2) under the 
Commerce Clause, where Congress has the power to “regulate Commerce 
                                                                                                                     
15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2; U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Mortin v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974); Worchester v. Georgia, 31 
U.S. 515, 595 (1832); The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
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with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”16 This last provision has been the foundation for Congressional 
power over Indian affairs, and it forms the legal basis for Congress’ plenary 
power over matters involving Indians.17 Additionally, tribal sovereignty is 
an important concept in this discussion, and is imperative to understanding 
the ICWA. Tribal sovereignty is based on the inherent authority of Indian 
tribes to self-govern.18 This authority is subordinate only to the federal, not 
state, government.19 
Two of the most important US Supreme Court cases outlining federal 
power over the Indian tribes are Worchester v. Georgia20 and Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia.21 In Worchester, the question before the Court was the 
validity of a prison sentence imposed on a non-Indian individual by the 
state of Georgia for entering Cherokee land without state permission.22 The 
Court found the state law, which extended state jurisdiction to Indian land, 
to be invalid.23 Chief Justice John Marshall articulated several core tenants 
of federal law as it relates to the Indian tribes.24 He reasoned that the US 
Constitution delegates power over Indian affairs to the federal government 
and withholds this power from the individual states.25 Furthermore, Justice 
                                                                                                                     
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2 
(“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding 
Indians not taxed.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
17 The phrase “plenary power” comes from the US Supreme Court’s opinion in Morton 
v. Mancari: there exists “a plenary power of congress, based on a history of treaties and 
the assumption of a ‘guardian-ward’ status, to legislate on behalf of federally recognized 
Indian tribes.” Mortin v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974). 
18 Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832). 
19 Id, at 595. 
20 Id. 
21 The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
22 Worchester, 31 U.S. at 515. 
23 Id. at 595. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 535. 
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Marshall reasoned that that the tribes retain their sovereign powers unless, 
and until, Congress chooses to take these powers away.26 Under this 
rationale, the tribe’s power is derived from inherent sovereign power as 
“distinct, independent political communities” that predate the federal 
government.27 However, the federal government, as the ultimate authority 
over the tribes, retains the sole power to erode this tribal sovereign 
authority.28 
In Cherokee Nation, Justice Marshall further described the dynamic of 
the Indian tribes and their sovereignty dynamic in the United States.29 
Justice Marshall defined the Indian tribes as “domestic dependent 
nations.”30 Additionally, he described the “guardian-ward” relationship 
between the federal government and Indian tribes in which the government 
has the duty to act as a “guardian” for the tribes.31 In this manner, Justice 
Marshall articulated the specific role of the federal government in 
protecting tribes from encroaching on state government power. These 
dueling concepts create a unique and complicated legal landscape for tribes. 
On the one hand, tribes are recognized as “nations” and have areas of 
authority and sovereignty, such as forming a government, determining tribal 
membership, regulating domestic relations, and participating in commerce 
and trade.32 On the other hand, Congress, through its plenary power in the 
                                                                                                                     
26 Id. at 538. 
27 Id. at 559. 
28 Id. at 595.  
29 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 1. 
30 Id. at 2. 
31 Id. at 17. 
32 See Worchester, 31 U.S. at 515; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 1; see also Frequently 
asked questions, US DEP’T INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,  
http://www.bia.gov/FAQs (“Tribes possess all powers of self-government except those 
relinquished under treaty with the United States, those that Congress has expressly 
extinguished, and those that federal courts have ruled are subject to existing federal law 
or are inconsistent with overriding national policies. Tribes, therefore, possess the right to 
form their own governments; to make and enforce laws, both civil and criminal; to tax; to 
establish and determine membership (i.e., tribal citizenship); to license and regulate 
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Constitution, has been given the right to protect and preserve Indian tribes 
and their resources, including Indian children.33 
Therefore, a strong tension exists between the inherent sovereignty of the 
Indian tribes and the encroaching sovereignty and power of the federal and 
state governments. In this tension, tribal authority is often enhanced by 
federal Congressional Acts. The ICWA is an example of such an 
enhancement. 
B. Indian Children Removal 
In order to understand the intended impact of the ICWA and the WICWA 
on dependency proceedings, it is important to understand the history and 
conditions that led to the 1978 passage of the ICWA. Predominately, the 
United States has a long and painful history of attempted Indian 
assimilation into Anglo-Christian culture.34 Of particular focus in this 
pursuit has been the systematic separation of Indian children from their 
families.35 
This trend of separation and removal began in the nineteenth century 
during a time period many academics refer to as the “Removal Era” 
because government agencies implemented devastating policies intended to 
quash tribal culture.36 The first recorded instances of Indian child removal 
from Indian communities date back to the Creek Wars, fought from 1813 to 
1815, when future US President Andrew Jackson housed and cared for an 
                                                                                                                     
activities within their jurisdiction; to zone; and to exclude persons from tribal lands.”) 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2013).  
33 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1993). 
34 See MARILYN IRVIN HOLT, INDIAN ORPHANAGES 2 (2001). 
35 Id. 
36 See Dewi Ioan Ball, Williams v. Lee 50 Years Later: A Reassessment of One of the 
Most Important Cases in the Modern-Era of Federal Indian Law, 2010 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 391, 412 (2010); Addie C. Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari: Indian Political 
Rights As Racial Remedy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 1045 (2011). 
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Indian toddler whose parents had been killed by American troops.37 The 
young boy lived with the Jackson family and was intended to be a playmate 
for Jackson’s son.38 The Indian boy received an education and learned a 
trade before dying at sixteen.39 Jackson’s Secretary of War also “adopted” 
an Indian child who had been orphaned during the Creek Wars; however, 
after three years in the home, the boy escaped.40 The Secretary’s wife wrote 
to a friend stating that “I never saw him afterwards; but we heard of him. . . 
. [He] had found his own people.”41 
During the late 1800s and early 1900s, the fields of sociology and social 
work emerged in social science academia and quickly inserted their familial 
values on Indian families and communities. Within these professional 
disciplines, an increasingly hostile worldview developed towards 
communities, including Indian tribes, who “failed to function within the 
parameters of white, middle-class expectations.”42 Social workers, backed 
by state and local governments, felt compelled to invade families out of a 
“scared obligation” to intercede in non-white, non-middle-class families.43 
Out of this “sacred obligation,” physical removal of children from these 
families to government institutions became increasingly popular.44 In 1890, 
there were 60,981 children under the age of sixteen in government 
institutions; in 1923, the number rose to 204,888.45 The majority of these 
children had at least one living parent.46  
                                                                                                                     





42 Id. at 3. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 4. 
46 Id. 
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 As part of Removal Era policy, many states also sent thousands of Indian 
children to “boarding schools” in an attempt to educate and transform 
Indian children “into productive members of the dominant white culture.”47 
These schools served as a core tenant of the US assimilation policy to 
“destroy” the children’s ties to their tribal identities.48 Indian children were 
thus “harshly treated, punished for speaking their own language, and 
consistently instructed to purge themselves of all traces of Indian culture.”49  
 An army officer by the name of Richard Pratt founded many of these 
boarding schools in the nineteenth century, basing the education curriculum 
on a program he had developed for Indian prisons.50 Pratt described his 
philosophy for these schools in a speech when he stated, “a great general 
has said that the only good Indian is a dead one. In a sense, I agree with the 
sentiment, but only in this: that all the Indian there is in the race should be 
dead. Kill the Indian in him, and save the man.”51 
The legacy of this destructionist sentiment continued for decades. In a 
case from 1945, Bill Wright, a Pattwin Indian, was sent to the Stewart 
Indian School in Nevada when he was just six years old.52 Wright recalls, 
“students at [the] boarding schools were forbidden to express their 
culture—everything from wearing long hair to speaking even a single 
Indian word.”53 In fact, Wright lost both his language and his Indian 
name.54 He stated: 
                                                                                                                     
47 Id. at 14. 
48 Id. 
49 Schnuelle, supra note 4. 
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I can remember coming home and my grandma asked me to talk 
Indian to her. I said, “Grandma, I don’t understand you,” and she 
said, “Then who are you?” 
I told her my name is Billy. “Your name’s not Billy. Your name’s 
‘TAH-rruhm,” she said. And I went, “That’s not what they told 
me.”55 
Wright’s experiences demonstrate the boarding schools’ singular goal— 
assimilating Indian children into white, Anglo-Christian culture. 
While boarding schools greatly contributed to the disconnection between 
Indian children and their families and culture, an even larger component of 
this assimilation policy was the placement of Indian children with non-
Indian adoptive families or in non-Indian foster homes.56 In particular, 
Indian women who gave birth out of wedlock were targeted by government 
social workers as candidates for child removal out of moral judgment.57 
This policy focused on the following notion: 
[A] woman who chose not to marry and keep her child was 
considered flawed and weak because she rejected society’s 
willingness to “rehabilitate” her by lettering her put the child up 
for adoption and ‘start over’ as if nothing had happened. In the 
1950s, sociologists began to survey and analyze women who were 
unwed and pregnant. After administering a battery of tests to 
residents at homes for unwed mothers, one sociologist used his 
‘interpretive impressions’ to declare that women who kept 
children, when they were unwed, were emotionally and mentally 
immature. It was a white, middle-class interpretative impression 
that permeated the social worker mind-set. When social pressure 
combined with poverty and limited economic prospects, a young 
woman was primed for placing her child up for adoption.58 
                                                                                                                     
55 Id. 
56 HOLT, supra note 34, at 5. 
57 Id. at 5–6. 
58 Id. at 5. 
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Such removal, through adoption, was largely based on the idea held by both 
public and private child welfare agencies that “Indian children would be 
better off growing up non-Indian.”59 
 Social workers were also able to remove Indian children from Indian 
families “based on something as dubious as ‘immoral conduct,’ which 
included actions like illicit co-habitation” and other Indian cultural 
markers.60 During the 1968 ICWA hearings, William Byler, the Executive 
Director of the Association of American Indian Affairs, explained the 
practice of removing Indian children from “co-habitation” environments.61 
Byler explained that on one reservation, more than 50 percent of the people 
lived in these common-law situations,62 with unions lasting five to fifteen 
years.63 Police sometimes made a sweep of an entire reservation, arresting 
those living in illicit cohabitation environments,64 and removing their 
children.65 
Additionally, social workers often cited problems, such as insufficient 
housing space and caretaking of an Indian child by a “distant relative,” as 
examples of child abuse.66 However, the size of a particular home or the 
caretaking role by other members of the tribe is largely based on cultural 
custom and not issues of neglect.67  
 Overall, Mr. Byler’s example illustrates how people tasked with making 
child neglect determinations, such as state social workers, commonly 
viewed Indian child cases through the lens of Anglo American middle-class 
                                                                                                                     
59 Megan Scanlon, Comment, From Theory to Practice: Incorporating the “Active 
Efforts” Requirement in Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 629, 
631 (Summer 2011). 





65 Id.    
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
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values and ignored Indian culture and familial structures.68 This viewpoint 
was terribly destructive to Indian tribes. 
In the 1960s, tribes began to fight back against removal of Indian 
children from their communities as statistics about the pervasive and 
widespread nature of this practice began to emerge. In 1969 and 1974, the 
Association on American Indian Affairs (AAIA) “estimated that between 
25 and 35 percent of all Indian children are separated from their families 
and placed in foster homes, adoptive homes, or institutions.”69 On a 
national level, “one out of every four children of Indian American heritage 
was separated from family by the mid-1970s, and Indian children were 
twenty times more likely than non-Indian children to be placed in foster 
care.”70 In the 1977 congressional hearings before the Senate Committee on 
Indian Affairs, it was confirmed that 25 percent of all Indian children were 
being raised in non-Indian homes or institutions.71 In fact, when adoption 
placements were created for these Indian children, between 75 and 93 
percent were placed with non-Indian families.72 
The extent of child removal varied from state to state. In Minnesota, from 
1971 to 1972, one in every eight Indian children under eighteen years of 
age lived in a non-Indian adoptive home, while one in every four Indian 
children under one year of age had been adopted by non-Indian families.73 
Similarly, in Montana, “Indian children were thirteen times more likely to 
be put into foster care and adoptive placements than non-Indians.”74 In 
South Dakota, “Indian children were sixteen times more likely than non-
                                                                                                                     
68 HOLT, supra note 34, at 5. 
69 Id. at 4–5. 
70 Id. 
71 John Robert Renner, The Indian Child Welfare Act and Equal Protection Limitations 
on the Federal Power Indian Affairs, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 129, 142 (1992). 
72 Id. at 142–43. 
73 Marcia Yablon, The Indian Child Welfare Act Amendments of 2003, 38 FAM. L. Q. 
689, 691 (2004). 
74 Id. 
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Indians” to be living in foster care.75 Furthermore, it was determined that, 
while the South Dakota Indian population in 1960 was 3.6 percent of the 
total population, 50 percent of all children in South Dakota foster care were 
Indian.76 
In Washington, in the 1960s and 1970s, nineteen times as many Indian 
children were in adoptive homes than non-Indian children, and Indian 
children were placed in foster care ten times more regularly than non-Indian 
children.77 In response to these staggering numbers, the congressional 
report on Indian child welfare during the passage of the ICWA stated, “the 
whole separation of Indian children from their families is perhaps the most 
tragic and destructive aspect of American Indian life today.”78 
The removal of Indian children from Indian families had a direct and 
profound impact on the tribes themselves. Indian tribes publically addressed 
these tragic separations in the years leading up to the enactment of the 
ICWA, contributing to the eventual passage of the ICWA. In the late 1960s, 
the Devils Lake Sioux in North Dakota brought their concerns about child 
removal policies to the AAIA.79 Other North Dakota tribes, the Standing 
Rock Sioux and the Three Affiliated Tribes (Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara 
Nation), joined this effort in the early 1970s.80 The Chief of the Mississippi 
Band of Choctaw Indians testified in the 1978 ICWA Senate hearings that 
“culturally, the chances of Indian survival are significantly reduced if our 
children, the only real means for the transmission of the tribal heritage, are 
                                                                                                                     
75 Id. 
76 HOLT, supra note 34, at 5. 
77 Schnuelle, supra note 4, at 104. 
78 Yablon, supra note 73. 
79 B.J. JONES ET AL., INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT: A PILOT STUDY OF COMPLIANCE IN 
NORTH DAKOTA 9 (2000), available at http://www.nicwa.org/research/04.ICWA.pdf 
[hereinafter, JONES ET AL., A PILOT STUDY]; Indian Child Welfare Act in California, 
CAL. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVICES, http://www.childsworld.ca.gov/pg1322.htm (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2013). 
80 JONES ET AL., A PILOT STUDY, supra note 79, at 9.  
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raised in non-Indian homes and denied exposure to the ways of their 
People.”81 With 25 to 35 percent of Indian children placed with non-Indian 
families between 1969 and 1974, this practice was termed by some as a 
form of “cultural genocide.”82 
III. THE ICWA’S PASSAGE, TERMS, AND COMPLIANCE  
When Congress passed the ICWA in 1978, the national political climate 
was ripe for societal change and social justice. In accordance with society’s 
changes, the values of self-determination and preservation began to 
influence Congressional interactions with the Indian nations.83 Congress 
enacted the ICWA in hopes that its specific provisions would sufficiently 
alter the relationship between the government and Indian tribes so that, 
while Indian children would still be adequately protected through CPS and 
dependency proceedings, these children would no longer be needlessly 
removed from their families, tribes, and native culture in the pursuit of 
assimilation.84  
After its passage, the US Supreme Court clarified ICWA’s goals and its 
corresponding provisions in only one case—Mississippi v. Holyfield.85 
Because of this minimal history of interpretation, agency understanding of 
the ICWA and its provisions has continued to be problematic as child 
protective agencies struggle to clarify its terms, particularly the mandate of 
                                                                                                                     
81 Solangel Maldonado, Race, Culture, and Adoption: Lessons from Mississippi Band of 
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 5 (2008). 
82 ANDREA WILKINS, STATE-TRIBAL COOPERATION AND THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE 
ACT (July 2008), available at http://www.ncsl.org/print/statetribe/ICWABrief08.pdf.  
83 HOLT, supra note 34, at 2. 
83 Id. 
84 Indian Children Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2012).  
85 490 U.S. 30 (1989).  
1244  SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
“active efforts” by social workers.86 Therefore, ICWA compliance has 
continued to significantly hinder Congress’ original ICWA aspirations.87 
 In order to combat these problems and provide useful, workable 
guidelines for agencies to follow, the terms of the ICWA and WICWA must 
be concrete, tangible, and quantifiably measured.  
A. The Theory Behind ICWA: A Season of Self-Determination 
Throughout US history, the federal government has implemented various 
policies and philosophies regarding the relationship between the Indian 
tribes and the US government. From 1945 to 1961, prior to the passage of 
the ICWA, and during the time period when the most significant Indian 
child removal transpired, the federal government was operating under its 
“termination theory.”88 Under this theory, the government had a policy of 
eroding tribal culture, structure, and sovereignty with the ultimate goal of 
terminating the tribes.89 During this period, 109 Indian tribes were removed 
from federal recognition and 1.3 million acres of Indian land were lost.90  
However, as a result of several shifts in the US governmental and 
political landscape, including the increasingly popular and important civil 
rights movements of the 1960s, the US government’s policy towards Indian 
tribes moved from termination to self-determination.91 Under this new 
philosophy, the federal government would theoretically have less control 
                                                                                                                     
86 Scanlon, supra note 59, at 631–33.  
87 B.J. Jones, The Indian Child Welfare Act: In Search of a Federal Forum to Vindicate 
the Rights of Indian Tribes and Children Against the Vagaries of State Courts, 73 N.D. 
L. REV. 395, 398 (1997) [hereinafter Jones, In Search of a Federal Forum]. 
88 DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKENSON & ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, CASES AND 
MATERIALS OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (2004). 
89 Id.  
90 Id. 
91 S. Bobo Dean & Joseph H. Webster, Contract Support Funding and the Federal Policy 
of Indian Tribal Self-Determination, 36 Tulsa L.J. 349 (2000). 
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and less intervention in Indian affairs.92 However, at the same time, the 
federal government still maintained its “guardian-ward” trust relationship to 
the tribes as outlined in the Marshall cases from the nineteenth century.93  
The ICWA was enacted in 1978 as a result of this tension.94 The Act 
“wove itself around the fundamental question of a culture’s right to its own 
children and the ways in which the dominant culture enforced its child 
welfare and parental custodial statutes.”95 The ICWA is a paramount 
example of the tension between Congress’s intent and responsibility to treat 
Indian tribes as independent, self-governing bodies, and the dependency the 
tribes have on the federal government’s economic, political, and legal 
support.96 
B. Goals of the ICWA 
In response to alarming rates of Indian children being removed from their 
families, Congress passed the ICWA in 1978 with the goal of implementing 
“a national policy to protect the best interest of Indian children and to 
promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families.”97 To 
achieve these goals, the ICWA established a series of minimum federal 
standards for situations involving the removal of an Indian child from his or 
her family, and regulations for the placement of such a child in foster or 
adoptive homes.98 Additionally, Indian tribes were made parties to the 
dependency proceedings and given standing.99 As a result, when a state 
                                                                                                                     
92 Id.  
93 See Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,30 
U.S. 1 (1831). 
94 Id. 
95 See HOLT, supra note 34, at 1. 
96 See Tucker, supra note 12, at 95. 
97 Indian Children Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2012); Schnuelle, 
supra note 4, at 106. 
98 Schnuelle, supra note 4, at 107–08. 
99 25 U.S.C. § 1903 (2012). 
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agency removes an Indian child from his or her biological family, the 
potential for loss of cultural ties to the Indian community must be taken into 
account. In totality, the ICWA seeks to preserve, whenever possible, Indian 
culture by both limiting state jurisdiction over dependency proceedings and 
bolstering tribal authority.100 The Act pursues these goals through both 
procedural requirements on parties in state courts, and substantive 
requirements on social service agencies and courts.101 Despite these efforts, 
ambiguities still linger at the state level. 
C. US Supreme Court Clarification of the ICWA: Mississippi v. Holyfield 
Only once has the US Supreme Court specifically addressed the ICWA. 
In the 1988 case of Mississippi v. Holyfield, the Court attempted to clarify 
some ambiguities in the 1978 version of the ICWA.102 The Court affirmed 
the scope of tribal jurisdiction under the ICWA, holding that tribal courts 
have default and exclusive jurisdiction over child custody proceedings 
involving Indian children who are either domiciled, or reside, on a 
reservation.103 This case arose out of definitional ambiguity, as the ICWA 
did not initially define “domicile.”104 The Court in Holyfield, therefore, set 
forth a narrow definition of “domicile” under the ICWA in an attempt to 
address the application of the Act across the nation.105 
Holyfield involved Jennie Bell, a member of the federally recognized 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, and her biological children.106 Ms. 
Bell was a “twenty-four year old single mother of two, and she was 
pregnant with twins by a man who was married to another woman and [had] 
                                                                                                                     
100 See id. 
101 See Jones, In Search of a Federal Forum, supra note 87, at 397.  
102 See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989). 
103 Id. at 42. 
104 Id. at 36, 40, 42–43. 
105 Id. at 46–53. 
106 Id. at 37–38. 
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two children of his own.”107 Due to these circumstances, Ms. Bell sought to 
relinquish her twins for adoption to Orrey and Vivian Joan Holyfield, a 
non-Indian couple living on non-Indian land.108 Ms. Bell gave birth to the 
twins in a hospital 200 miles from the Choctaw reservation and executed a 
consent form to relinquish her parental rights to the Holyfields.109 The 
ICWA was not applied.110 However, the Choctaw Tribe filed suit against 
the Holyfields four years later stating that, although the children were born 
off of Indian land, the tribe should have had jurisdiction under the ICWA.111 
The US Supreme Court granted certiorari in this matter and addressed the 
questions of whether the twins were ever “domiciled” on the Choctaw 
reservation, and whether the ICWA provisions should have applied.112 The 
Court held the twins shared the domicile of their mother, despite the fact 
that they were born off-reservation.113 Thus, the Court granted the tribe 
jurisdiction.114 
In reaching this determination, the Court focused on the congressional 
intent for enacting the ICWA. In particular, the Court relied on the ICWA’s 
purpose to “establish a federal policy that, where possible, an Indian child 
should remain in the Indian community” and ensure that “Indian child 
welfare determinations are not based on a white, middle-class standard 
which, in many cases, forecloses placement with an Indian family.”115 
Additionally, the Court articulated an aversion to non-Indian involvement 
in Indian child custody proceedings, stating that “the very text of the 
ICWA” along with “its legislative history and the hearings that led to its 
                                                                                                                     
107 Maldonado, supra note 81, at 1. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 30. 
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enactment” illustrated that “Congress was concerned with the rights of 
Indian families and Indian communities vis-à-vis state authorities.”116 In 
this manner, the Court emphasized the need for national compliance, and 
adherence to the ICWA provisions, in individual states to ensure deference 
to tribal protection of heritage and family connections. While the Court has 
not granted certiorari to any other case involving the ICWA since Holyfield, 
in that case, it unequivocally acknowledged the federal government’s 
recognition of tribal sovereignty and authority in Indian child welfare 
matters. 
D. Specific ICWA Provisions 
The specific provisions of the ICWA are only triggered if two conditions 
are met.117 First, the state action must be under the scope of the ICWA’s 
definition of a “child custody proceeding.”118 Under the ICWA, this 
definition includes voluntary and involuntary foster care placement, pre-
adoptive and adoptive placement, and any other state action that results in 
the termination of parental rights.119 Excluded from this ICWA provision 
are matters of juvenile delinquency and divorce custody actions.120 Second, 
the provisions of the ICWA only apply to a particular proceeding if that 
proceeding involves an Indian child.121 Under the ICWA, an “Indian child” 
is defined as “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either 
(a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an 
Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.”122 
To meet this requirement, one must show proof of membership in an Indian 
                                                                                                                     
116 Id. at 44–45. 
117 25 U.S.C. § 1913 (2012). 
118 See id. 
119 Id. 
120 25 U.S.C § 1903(1). 
121 25 U,S.C. § 1903 (2012). 
122 Id. § 1903(4). 
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tribe.123 The ICWA, similar to other federal statutes involving tribes, 
defines an “Indian tribe” as “any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other 
organized group or community of Indians recognized as eligible for the 
services provided by Indians by the Secretary [of the Interior] because of 
their status as Indians.”124 From these definitions, only federally recognized 
tribes and their members are protected under the ICWA. 
 In order to accomplish the dual goals of limiting state jurisdiction and 
strengthening tribal jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings, the 
ICWA has several main provisions: 
 Indian tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over any Indian child 
custody proceeding when that child either resides or is domiciled 
on an Indian reservation. If the Indian child resides off the 
reservation, “the court, in the absence of good cause to the 
contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the 
tribe.” Absent an objection by the parents or the Indian tribe, both 
the tribal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction. However, 
there is a preference in these cases for tribal jurisdiction.125 
 Notice must be given to both the Indian child’s birth parent(s) or 
custodian(s) as well as the Indian child’s tribe before an 
involuntary custody proceeding can begin in state court.126 
 A strong preference is articulated for matters involving ICWA 
children to be resolved in tribal court. State courts must transfer 
cases involving Indian children to a tribal court if either the 
parent, the Indian custodian, or the Indian child’s tribe petitions 
such a transfer. A state court is only able to overcome this petition 
if there is a “good cause to the contrary,” or if either parent 
objects.127 
                                                                                                                     
123 See id. § 1903(5). 
124 Id. § 1903(8). 
125 Id. § 1911. 
126 Id. § 1912(a). 
127 Id. § 1911. 
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 If jurisdiction is not transferred to tribal court, a state court is 
held to high standards regarding both foster care placement and 
the termination of parental rights. For a state court to place an 
Indian child into non-Indian foster care, the state must submit 
clear and convincing evidence that failure to remove the child 
from his or her environment is likely to result in serious physical 
or emotional damage to the child.128 For a state court to terminate 
the parental right of an Indian child, the state must show proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that failure to do so will result in 
serious physical or emotional harm to the child.129 Additionally, 
any party, such as a state agency, seeking foster care placement or 
termination of parental rights must provide proof of active efforts 
to prevent the breakup of the Indian family.130 
 Voluntary termination of parental rights by an Indian parent 
requires court certification that the parent fully understands the 
consequence of such a procedure. The parent can withdraw this 
consent to termination at any time.131 
 Regarding placement of an Indian child after parental rights have 
been terminated, particular preferences must be adhered to. In 
“absence of good cause to the contrary,” the state’s placement for 
an Indian child must be in accordance with these priorities: (a) a 
member of the child’s extended family, (b) other members of the 
Indian child’s tribe, and then, (c) other Indian families.132 
Furthermore, if a child is placed in foster care or preadoptive 
placement, the Indian child must be placed within “a reasonable 
proximity” to the child’s home in the “least restrictive setting” 
that most approximates a family.133 
                                                                                                                     
128 Id. § 1912(e). 
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133 Id. § 1915(b). 
        Do We Have It Right This Time?  1251 
VOLUME 11 • ISSUE 3 • 2013 
 If the state court violates any of the ICWA provisions, a petition 
from the child’s parents, custodian, or tribe can invalidate the 
child’s placement.134 
Therefore, in light of these provisions, if a child is deemed Indian under 
the definitional terms of the statute, the state must take additional steps 
before removing the child by determining proper jurisdiction, including the 
child’s tribe as a party in the case, and meeting a higher burden. These 
provisions were enacted with the goals of protecting Indian children and 
Indian tribes from needless state action regarding child removal. 
E. The “Active Efforts” Standard in the ICWA 
Including the general provisions outlined above, the ICWA outlines an 
additional standard state agencies must meet in order to remove an ICWA 
child from his or her home. This additional standard is set forth in Section 
1912(d), which states the following: 
[A]ny party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, 
or termination of parental rights to, any Indian child under 
State law shall satisfy the court that active efforts 
[emphasis added] have been made to provide remedial 
services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent 
the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts 
have proved unsuccessful.135  
In this provision of the ICWA, states have adopted a wide range of 
interpretations as they struggle to define the standard that applicable state 
agencies must meet in order to prove that adequate “active efforts” have 
been made to keep the child with his or her birth family. In other words, 
states have continued to wrestle with the following question: how much 
work, or effort, must a state social worker do or put in to preserve the 
Indian child’s existing family structure? 
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Since there is no statutory clarification in the ICWA as to the definition 
of “active efforts,” or instruction of how a state can meet the standard of 
sufficient “active efforts,” this portion of the ICWA has proven particularly 
problematic. In California and Colorado, courts have stated that “active 
efforts” are equivalent to “reasonable efforts”—the same standard used for 
non-ICWA child custody proceedings.136 Conversely, courts in Utah and 
Oklahoma have interpreted “active efforts” to mean more than “reasonable 
efforts.”137 Thus far, no national clarification or consensus exists on exactly 
what “active efforts” means for a social worker or a similarly situated state 
official involved in an Indian child custody proceeding. 
In 2002, the National Indian Child Welfare Association released a 
detailed and comprehensive report highlighting the state of Arizona’s 
compliance to the ICWA, which illustrated the continued confusion over 
the definition of “active efforts.”138 The report included a “focus group” 
component where state agency child welfare professionals discussed the 
difference between “active efforts” and “reasonable efforts.”139 The results 
of this professional group discussion indicated the following: 
[N]o general consensus was reached as to whether or not “active 
efforts” require[s] a different standard of proof. [S]ome believed 
that “active” and “reasonable” are equivalent, but others indicated 
that active efforts require a higher legal standard. Most agreed that 
no clear definition exists for either active or reasonable efforts.140 
Ultimately, the report concluded the following: 
                                                                                                                     
136 Scanlon, supra note 59, at 630. 
137 Id. 
138 See EDDIE F. BROWN ET AL., NAT’L INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ASS’N, THE INDIAN 
CHILD WELFARE ACT: AN EXAMINATION OF STATE COMPLIANCE IN ARIZONA 77 
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139 See id. at 17–18. 
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[A]mong state and tribal representatives, no agreement exists as to 
the meaning of active efforts. . . . Workers have no clear guidelines 
for active efforts to develop and implement case plans, and the 
state court has no systematic way of ruling on the application of 
active efforts with Indian families.141 
In other words, the agency professionals tasked with adhering to the 
ICWA’s “active efforts” standard were not collectively able to determine 
what this standard meant. 
The problem of defining “active efforts” extends to other states beyond 
Arizona. In 2000, North Dakota published a study regarding its own ICWA 
compliance.142 This study revealed that only 66 percent of its ICWA child 
custody cases contained documentation of “active efforts.”143 The most 
egregious finding was the wide disparity between ICWA and “active 
efforts” compliance across different county and regional lines—there was 
simply no uniform implementation whatsoever.144 Similar to Arizona, state 
agencies and their legal teams in North Dakota are left to decide for 
themselves what constitutes an “active effort” without a clear national 
definition of what this entails. Therefore, significant differences and 
deviations exist in implementing the ICWA across the states. 
F. Compliance with the ICWA: Does the Act Really Accomplish its Goals? 
The application and implementation of the ICWA in state courts on a 
national level has been uneven and problematic, due in part to the uncertain 
meaning of “active efforts.” In fact, some argue the goals of ICWA—to 
bolster tribal sovereignty and preserve Indian culture through Indian 
children—“[have] proven to be illusory and the goal of uniformity a 
                                                                                                                     
141 Id. at 19. 
142 JONES ET AL., A PILOT STUDY, supra note 79. 
143 Id. at 44. 
144 Id. at 34, 38, 53. 
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farce.”145 In an attempt to circumnavigate the ICWA provisions, some states 
have created exceptions and loopholes to the ICWA that “have render[ed] 
many of its provisions superfluous.”146 
In particular, states have eroded the strength of the ICWA and tribal 
sovereignty in these proceedings by expanding the “existing Indian family” 
exception and refusing to comply with the strict standards articulated in the 
ICWA.147 In the “existing Indian family” doctrine, an exception is created 
to the application of ICWA and its provisions when an Indian child, “has 
never resided with an Indian family.”148 While the Supreme Court in 
Holyfield seemed to discredit this doctrine and its ruling, several state 
courts have found ways to continue to implement this exception. Through 
this exception, these states are, “able to question the ability of tribal courts 
and social service agencies to effectively provide for the best interests of 
Indian children,” and in doing so, turn “the congressional presumption in 
favor of tribal court decision-making on its head.”149 
These concerns about ICWA compliance have manifested in numerous 
states, but in particular, South Dakota.150 In South Dakota, according to a 
2011 study, Indian children make up less than 15 percent of the child 
population, yet make up more than half of the children in foster care.151 In 
fact, in 2010 alone, more than 700 Indian children were removed from their 
                                                                                                                     
145Jones, In Search of a Federal Forum, supra note 87, at 396. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 397. 
148 Id. at 400. 
149 Id. at 398. 
150 Laura Sullivan & Amy Walters, Indian Foster Care: Lost Children, Shattered 
Families. American Indian Boarding Schools Haunt Many, NPR, Oct. 25, 2011, 
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151  Laura Sullivan & Amy Walters, Incentives and Cultural Bias Fuel Foster System, 
NPR (Oct. 25, 2011, 12:00 p.m.), http://www.npr.org/2011/10/25/141662357/incentives-
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homes.152 In one particular tribe—the Crow Creek with only 1,400 
members—thirty-three children have been removed over the last couple 
years.153 In light of these numbers, it is questionable whether the goal of 
preserving Indian culture and heritage by keeping Indian children in Indian 
families is being met on a national level. 
IV. THE ICWA AND WASHINGTON STATE: 1978 TO 2011 
 The ICWA’s application in Washington is unique and interesting due to 
several factors. First, Washington has addressed, and continues to default, 
state and tribal jurisdictional issues in a distinctive and different legal 
framework called “Public Law 280.”154 Second, Washington courts have 
specifically rejected an interpretation of an ICWA provision, called the 
“existing family exception,” that other state courts have adopted.155  
Nonetheless, despite Washington’s general policy of upholding tribal rights 
and culture, ICWA compliance in Washington has been lacking, and the 
racial disproportion of Indian children in the foster care system has 
continued.156  
A. Washington as a “Public Law 280” State 
The application and adherence to the ICWA is complicated in 
Washington because it is categorized as a “Public Law 280” state.157 In a 




154 See Memorandum from Robert T. Anderson, Professor, Univ. of Wash. Sch. of 
Law, Dir., Native Am. Law Ctr., Criminal & Civil Jurisdiction & P.L. 280 (Mar. 3, 
2011), available at http://www.leg.wa.gov/JointCommittees/JELWGTR 
/Documents/2011-07-18/PL280%20Washington3%203%2011.pdf. 
155 In Re Crews, 825 P.2d 305, 310 (Wash. 1992). 
156 WASH. STATE INST. ON PUB. POLICY, RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY IN 
WASHINGTON STATE’S CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/08-06-3901.pdf. 
157 See Anderson, supra note 154.  
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the tribes in certain areas, despite the nineteenth century cases in the federal 
Indian law canon.158  
In the 1950s, the national Indian policy was centered on the goals of 
termination and destruction of tribal sovereignty.159 In line with this 
viewpoint, Congress enacted Public Law 280 in 1953160 to “deal with the 
problem of lawlessness on certain Indian reservations and the absence of 
adequate tribal institutions for law enforcement.”161 Concretely, Public Law 
280 declared that in six states, state jurisdiction extended over Indian 
reservations.162  
At the time of Public Law 280’s enactment, Washington had a specific 
disclaimer in its state constitution that Indians “shall remain under the 
absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States.”163 
Although Public Law 280’s extension of state jurisdiction over Indian 
territory was in direct conflict with this language, Public Law 280 was 
enacted in Washington. From this enactment, Washington took over civil 
and criminal jurisdiction on Indian land via laws passed in 1957 and 
1963.164 
The effects of this take over were mitigated in March 2012 when the 
Washington legislature approved House Bill 2233, which provides an 
avenue for Indian tribes to assume jurisdiction over their lands that are 
currently held by the state under Public Law 280.165 While this brand new 
law has yet to be fully tested in practice, it appears Indian tribes may, 
through a variety of procedural maneuvers, be able to petition the state 
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159 See, e.g., 25 U.S.C §§ 1321–1326 (2012). 
160 Schnuelle, supra note 4, at 125. 
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government for “retrocede” jurisdiction on tribal land.166 Nevertheless, 
Washington enacted a state ICWA, not only because of its issues in 
adhering to the federal ICWA, but also because it wanted to retain some 
jurisdiction over tribal land and affairs under Public Law 280.167 
B. Rejection of “Existing Indian Family” Doctrine by the Washington 
Legislature 
Another issue regarding the ICWA in Washington has been the 
application and subsequent rejection of the “existing Indian family” 
doctrine. The “existing Indian family” doctrine is an exception to the 
provisions in the ICWA.168 Some states have used this exception as a 
loophole to avoid applying the ICWA provisions and standards to particular 
child custody proceedings.169 This exception applies when the state finds 
that the child in question is not a part of an “existing Indian family” and, 
therefore, ICWA’s provisions do not apply.170 
The “existing Indian family” exception arose from Baby Boy L., a famous 
Kansas Supreme Court decision.171 In that case, the Kansas court found the 
provisions of the ICWA did not apply to an adoption proceeding of a child 
who had a non-Indian birth mother and an Indian birth father.172 In Baby 
Boy L., the child had never lived with his Indian birth father.173 The non-
Indian birth mother sought to voluntarily place her child for adoption with a 
non-Indian couple.174 The Kansas court found that the legislative intent of 




168 In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 175 (Kan. 1982). 
169 Yablon, supra note 73, at 702. 
170 Id. at 701. 
171 In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175. 
172 Id. at 172. 
173 Id. at 174. 
174 Id. 
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never lived in an Indian home, an Indian family would not be broken up 
and, therefore, the ICWA did not apply.175 Baby Boy L. was a seminal case 
for ICWA litigation because the Kansas court relied entirely on an 
interpretation of the legislative intent of the ICWA and ignored the literal 
application—that the adoption placement was a “child custody proceeding” 
under the Act’s terms, and the child in question was an “Indian” child under 
the Act’s definitions.176 Many argue that the “existing Indian family” 
exception is an attempt to erode the authority and sovereignty given to 
tribes through the ICWA.177 
Ten years after Baby Boy L. was decided, the Washington Supreme Court 
adopted the “existing Indian family” exception in its first ICWA case.178 In 
deciding In re Crews, the Court was faced with a situation where a tribe 
was contesting the adoption of a baby boy who was born to parents who, at 
the time of adoption, claimed to have no Indian heritage.179 However, after 
the boy was placed in the custody of the adoptive parents, the mother 
attempted to regain parental custody through the ICWA by stating that the 
boy was, in fact, an “Indian child.”180 She claimed that the boy was 
considered an “Indian child” due to the fact that the Choctaw Nation in 
Oklahoma now verified that she was a member of that tribe.181 In its 
holding, the In re Crews Court found the child was not an “Indian child” 
under the definitional terms of the ICWA because the case fell within the 
“existing Indian family” exception.182 The Court reasoned that, since 
neither the mother nor the father were culturally Indian, the child would not 
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be raised culturally Indian if he were to return to his biological parents, and 
that this situation fell outside the intended scope of the ICWA.183 
Specifically, the court found that:  
[T]here is no allegation by [the mother] or the Choctaw 
Nation that, if custody were returned to [the mother], [the 
child] would grow up in an Indian environment. To the 
contrary, [the mother] has shown no substantive interest 
in her Indian heritage in the past and has given no 
indication this will change in the future. While [the child] 
may be an “Indian child” based on the Choctaw 
Constitution, we do not find an existing Indian family 
unit or environment from which [the child] was removed 
or to which he would be returned. To apply ICWA in this 
specific situation would not further the policies and 
purposes of ICWA.184 
In this manner, the Washington Supreme Court, in its first case concerning 
the ICWA, limited and quantified the scope of the ICWA, as well as made 
specific determinations about the required character and form of tribal 
membership. 
While many courts—most predominantly two appellate divisions in 
California—have upheld the “existing Indian family” exception doctrine in 
ICWA cases, the Washington legislature statutorily invalidated the holding 
of In re Crews in 2004.185 Washington is now among the vast majority of 
states who have, either by case law or statute, explicitly rejected the 
“existing Indian family” exception as a means to circumnavigate the 
application of the ICWA provisions.186 However, this exception is still 
followed in Kentucky, Missouri, and Tennessee.187 In this manner, 
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Washington has demonstrated its ability and willingness to move toward 
greater adherence to the intent of the ICWA. 
C. Continued Racial Disproportionality in Washington’s Child Welfare 
System 
Despite progressive efforts by Washington courts to enforce the ICWA in 
rejecting the “existing family doctrine,” a disproportional number of Indian 
children still remain in Washington’s child welfare system.188 This 
disproportion was outlined in a study published by the Washington State 
Institute for Public Policy in June 2008 that followed 58,005 children from 
2004 to 2007.189 The study found that, in Washington, Indian children were 
three times more likely to be referred to CPS than white children.190 This 
rate is higher than black children (twice as likely as white children), 
Hispanic children (1.3 times as likely as white children), and Asian children 
(less likely than white children).191 In reference to removal from the family, 
Indian children were 1.6 times more likely to be removed from their home 
than white children, and were twice as likely to remain in foster care for 
over two years.192 These numbers are also higher than black, Hispanic, and 
Asian children.193 
In addition to these shocking figures, the report also discussed 
contributing factors to these statistics and general conclusions by racial 
grouping. First, the Third National Incidence Study of Child Abuse and 
Neglect found that there was a strong correlation between family poverty 
and child maltreatment.194 In 2004, 332,100 Washington children lived in 
                                                                                                                     
188 WASH. STATE INST. ON PUB. POLICY, supra note 156.  
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 8. 
192 Id. at 9. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 21. 
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households receiving food stamps, representing 24 percent of all the 
children in Washington.195 Furthermore, children with CPS referrals 
represent 7 percent of all children receiving food stamps in that year.196 
Second, family structure has a positive correlation to CPS referrals in 
Washington. For example, while only 18 percent of white children in 
Washington live in a single parent home, 74 percent of white children in 
foster care lived in a single parent home at the time of removal.197  
Finally, the study stated key findings for each racial group in 
Washington’s child welfare system. In comparison with white children, 
Indian children referred to CPS contained the following characteristics: (1) 
they were less likely to have a referral accepted; (2) they were more likely 
to have a high risk tag at intake; (3) they were more likely to be removed 
from home if they had a high risk tag at intake; (4) they were as likely to 
remain in care for over sixty days if removed from the home; and (5) they 
were more likely to remain in care for two years. 198 
In December of 2008, the Statewide Racial Disproportionality Advisory 
Committee published its action plan in response to the above report-—the 
Racial Disproportionality and Disparity in Washington State Child Welfare 
Remediation Plan.199 In this plan, the committee recommended to the 
Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) Secretary several 
provisions to combat this extreme disproportionality.200 One of the two 
recommendations articulated by this committee is stated as follows: 
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199 WASH. STATE RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY ADVISORY COMM., RACIAL 
DISPROPORTIONALITY IN WASHINGTON STATE CHILD WELFARE- REMEDIATION PLAN, 
0 (2008) available at http://www.goia.wa.gov/Links-Resources/RacialDisproportionality 
RemediationPlan.pdf. 
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[S]ubstantial amounts of racial disproportionality exist 
within the Washington State American Indian population. 
Emphasis on Indian Child Welfare compliance will be a 
priority [emphasis added]. Also, in-depth look at how 
racial disproportionality varies between Reservation 
Indians, Rural Indians, and Urban Indians.201  
 In 2010, the Washington State Racial Disproportionality Advisory 
Committee published another report to the legislature concerning the 
findings from the 2008 Washington State Institute for Public Policy 
report.202 This publication also included historical data on the removal of 
Indian children from their families in Washington.203 In 1975, prior to the 
passage of the ICWA, the American Indian foster care placement rate to 
Non-Indian families was 34.92 per 1,000 children in Washington.204 After 
the ICWA was enacted, the rate dropped to 18.24 per 1,000 children in 
1979.205 Similarly, the rate for Indian adoptions in 1975, before the ICWA, 
was 3.0 per 1,000 children.206 After the passage of the ICWA, in 1986, this 
rate dropped to 0.11 per 1,000 children.207 As a result, the committee 
recommended that further compliance with the ICWA was needed to 
continue to address the high rate of Indian children in Washington’s child 
welfare system.208 
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In particular, the committee specifically recommended an enactment of a 
Washington State Indian Child Welfare Act.209 This report stated the 
following: 
DSHS should study the impact that state-level Indian Child 
Welfare Acts have had in states that have implemented such state 
ICW legislation [and] if the study finds that implementation of 
state-level legislation increases compliance with the core tenants 
of ICW [Indian Child Welfare] and reduces racial 
disproportionality, DSHS should support enactment of a 
Washington State ICWA.210 
V. WASHINGTON’S INDIAN CHILD WELFARE (WICWA) 
In response to these reports and recommendations, in April 2011, the 
Washington legislature passed Senate Bill 5656—  
WICWA.211 In May 2011, Washington Governor Christine Gregoire signed 
this bill into law, which was later codified as RCW 13.38.212 WICWA is 
designed to apply specifically to RCW 13.34—child custody proceedings 
involving the state.213 The WICWA is intended to provide the following: (1) 
clarify Washington’s interpretation of the federal ICWA;214 (2) assure 
quicker, more accurate identification of Indian children in the child welfare 
system; (3) assure consistent application and enforcement of the federal 
ICWA; (4) assure existing policies, practices, and agreements developed 
over the last several years between the state and the tribes of Washington 
are the benchmarks against which federal ICWA compliance is measured; 
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210 Id.  
211 S.B. 5656, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011); 2011 Senate Bill 5656: Creating a 
State Indian Child Welfare Act, WASH. VOTES, http://washingtonvotes.org/2011-SB-
5656 (last visited Feb. 10, 2013). 
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and (5) better define the types of “child custody” cases affected by federal 
and state Indian child welfare laws.215 
By adopting the federal ICWA as state law, the Washington legislature 
attempted to bring greater clarification and, therefore, greater adherence to 
the application of the ICWA. By attempting to execute these goals, the 
legislature has failed to clarify a key provision of the federal statute—
“active efforts.” However, it has succeeded in defining another key 
provision: “the best interest of the child” in adherence to tribal 
sovereignty.216 
A. Clarification of “Active Efforts” 
Under the WICWA, the ICWA term, “active efforts,” is given some 
definitional clarity; however, this clarification is not enough. The “active 
efforts” standard refers to the minimum amount of work that a state agency 
or its employees, such as social workers, must do in attempting to prevent 
the removal of an Indian child from an Indian home.217 As discussed above, 
there has been widespread confusion about heightened standards in the 
ICWA, and the difference, if any, between the non-ICWA standard of 
“reasonable efforts” and the ICWA standard of “active efforts.” The 
Washington legislature attempted to address this confusion by defining 
“active efforts” in RCW 13.38.040(1).218 However, this standard is still 
ambiguous and difficult for state agents to navigate. 
Under RCW 13.38.040(1), at a minimum, “active efforts” must include 
the following: 
 In any dependency proceeding under chapter 13.34 RCW seeking 
out-of-home placement of an Indian child in which the 
department or supervising agency provided voluntary services to 
                                                                                                                     
215 WASH. REV. CODE §13.38.030 (2011). 
216 WASH. REV. CODE §13.38.040(2) (2011). 
217 See Scalon, supra note 59. 
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the parent, parents, or Indian custodian prior to filing the 
dependency petition, a showing to the court that the department or 
supervising agency social workers actively worked with the 
parent, parents, or Indian custodian to engage them in remedial 
services and rehabilitation programs to prevent the breakup of the 
family beyond simply providing referrals to such services 
[emphasis added]. 
 In any dependency proceeding under chapter 13.34 RCW, in 
which the petitioner is seeking the continued out-of-home 
placement of an Indian child, the department or supervising 
agency must show to the court that it has actively worked with the 
parent, parents, or Indian custodian in accordance with existing 
court orders and the individual service plan to engage them in 
remedial services and rehabilitative programs to prevent the 
breakup of the family beyond simply providing referrals to such 
services [emphasis added]. 
 In any termination of parental rights proceeding regarding an 
Indian child under chapter 13.34 RCW in which the department 
or supervising agency provided services to the parent, parents, or 
Indian custodian, a showing to the court that the department or 
supervising agency social workers actively worked with the 
parent, parents, or Indian custodian to engage them in remedial 
services and rehabilitation programs ordered by the court or 
identified in the department or supervising agency’s individual 
service and safety plan beyond simply providing referrals to such 
services [emphasis added].219 
In comparison to the ICWA of 1978, which provided no guidance as to 
the specific actions required to meet the “active efforts” burden of proof 
standard, the WICWA does clarify that “active efforts” must constitute 
something more than “simply providing referrals to such services.”220 
However, this vague definition does not provide enough clarity for social 
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providing referrals to such services” is endless. Is it enough for a social 
worker to simply spend more time on an ICWA case? If so, how much 
time? Must the social worker physically drive a family member to the 
service provider? Must the social worker attend a particular appointment? 
How much follow up, if any, is required? These are questions social 
workers confront each day as they attempt to adhere to the WICWA in their 
work. 
Although stating that “active efforts” means something beyond a referral 
is a step in the right direction, this action is still not sufficient to fill the gap 
of understanding and clarity that currently exists among state agencies and 
associated personnel. In order to sufficiently clarify “active efforts,” 
Washington must provide tangible examples of these efforts. Jurisdictions 
such as California have provided such tangible examples in their training 
materials of how active efforts differ from reasonable efforts.221 These 
training tools include several pages of concrete, practical hypotheticals in 
which the distinctions between “active efforts” and “reasonable efforts” are 
clarified for social workers.222 For instance, giving contact information to a 
parent for parenting classes would satisfy the social worker’s obligation for 
under “reasonable efforts” while, in order to meet the “active efforts” 
standard, the social worker would need to actually sign the parents up for 
parenting classes at a local Native American health center and arrange 
transportation to the classes.223 In another concrete example, giving a family 
TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Family) sign-up materials would 
meet “reasonable efforts”, while actually signing up the family for TANF 
and staying in regular contact with TANF providers meets “active 
                                                                                                                     
221 THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, CTR. FOR FAMILIES, CHILDREN & THE COURTS, 
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efforts.”224 Washington courts must provide similar training materials, but 
more importantly, include such examples in the statutory language. Without 
this clarification, definitions and standards of the required “active efforts” 
are left to agency committees and trainers’ discretion, not the legislature.  
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the intent of the ICWA and 
the WICWA is to preserve tribal culture and heritage.225 Therefore, any 
“active efforts” by state social workers must fit within this framework. 
Social workers must be required to utilize services and resources that are 
culturally sensitive to the tribal member. The Washington legislature should 
expand the “active efforts” clarification in the WICWA to include both 
tangible examples of these “active efforts” and preferential language for 
services and resources with Indian cultural focuses. 
B. The “Best Interests of the Child” 
While the Washington legislature did not provide sufficiently helpful 
language in its definition of “active efforts” in the WICWA, it did provide 
clarification and guidance for culturally-related resources regarding “the 
best interests of the child.”226 The recent passage of the WICWA, in 
addition to the ICWA, must be understood through the complicated and 
intersected role of race and power. Therefore, clarifying vague definitional 
terms, like the “best interests of the child,” with culturally-focused 
terminology through the WICWA is a step in the right direction. In this 
pursuit, it is also important to address and understand the role race plays in 
these proceedings and how issues of race, culture, and privilege are infused 
in this debate.227 To ignore these larger contextual issues is to ignore the 
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root of the problem. In particular, the “best interest of the child” standard in 
the ICWA is a pivotal topic in this discussion. 
The “best interest of the child” is a core doctrine in American legal 
theory, especially relating to family matters. In essence, the “best interest of 
the child” test has the dual goal of “avoiding placement of a child with an 
individual who is unfit” and also “seeking to choose otherwise fit 
individuals.”228 This Anglo-American test can be distilled to 
essentially middle class values to determine what setting will serve 
to protect the child from physical and emotional injury on the one 
hand and to better the child physically, emotionally, and 
educationally on the other. While racial, ethnic, and religious 
factors may play a role in determining placements [for children], 
they are secondary in importance.229 
Under the WICWA, it is clear that the legislature is concerned with the 
best interest of the individual child in question as it utilizes this standard 
family law test.230 However, WICWA proceedings are unique from other 
child custody proceedings in that the best interests of the child are also 
intertwined with the best interests of the tribe, culture, and family.231 The 
WICWA rejects the Anglo middle-class standard of the best interest of the 
child present in non-ICWA child custody proceedings and instead considers 
this standard along with other tribal and community health concerns.232 
Since the very intent of the ICWA and the WICWA is to reduce the 
destruction of Indian heritage through the removal of Indian children, 
Indian heritage and culture must be brought into the discussion when 
considering what the best interests of the child actually are. The 
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Washington legislature was relatively successful in bringing these 
considerations into the law’s construction.  
All too often in ICWA cases, the middle-class, Anglo-Christian 
viewpoint of what is best for the child dictates the outcome of the case. In 
these cases, the standard applied by the courts is what individuals or context 
will provide the child with the closest adherence to a middle-class, Anglo-
Christian life. This judicial reasoning in child custody proceedings is 
contradictory to the legislative intent and purpose of the federal and state 
ICWA provisions. However, under new statutory language in the WICWA, 
the best interests of the child standard is defined as follows: 
[T]he use of practices in accordance with the federal Indian child 
welfare act…that are designed to accomplish the following: (a) 
protect the safety, well-being, development, and stability of the 
Indian child; (b) prevent the unnecessary out-of-home placement 
of the Indian child; (c) acknowledge the right of Indian tribes to 
maintain their existence and integrity which will promote the 
stability and security of their children and families;  
(d) recognize the value to the Indian child of establishing, 
developing, or maintaining a political, cultural, social, and spiritual 
relationship with the Indian child’s tribe and tribal community; and  
(e) in a proceeding under this chapter where out-of-home 
placement is necessary, to prioritize placement of the Indian child 
in accordance with the placement preferences of this chapter.233 
Through this statutory language, the legislature has clearly articulated the 
central goal of the WICWA—to preserve Indian culture. Therefore, 
Washington courts, when applying the WICWA, must also consider and 
adhere to this goal. In order for the WICWA to be truly effective in the 
Washington court system and protect Indian children from removal from 
their families, Washington courts must embrace and adhere to the specific 
language and legislative intent of the WICWA. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Washington’s recent adoption of the ICWA as state law is an important 
step towards strengthening tribal authority and sovereignty in child custody 
proceedings of Indian children. Previously, the specific provisions of the 
ICWA, including the “active efforts” standard and the “best interest of the 
child” philosophy, were not entirely understood or followed in Washington.  
The WICWA has the opportunity to correct these issues. Under the 
WICWA, the legislature did a relatively good job of adopting a clear 
definition of the “best interest of the child” that bolsters the core policy of 
the ICWA. However, the legislature failed to adequately define in concrete 
terms and tangible examples the “active efforts” standard.  
In order to ensure state agencies and their employees adhere to the intent 
of the WICWA in both its substantive and procedural provisions, the 
language of this statute must be more clear, concrete, and useful to the 
average social worker. Only with tangible examples of the standards can 
ICWA’s goals be realized in Washington through the WICWA. Non-legal 
professionals must be given concrete and culturally sensitive resources and 
education about the history of Indian child removal in the United States, as 
well as easily implementable standards, to prevent similar harm to ensure 
Indian children in Washington are not needlessly removed from their 
families. 
 
